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ABSTRACT
Studies have shown that there is asymmetry in how sensitive CEO compensation is to
lucky factors (factors beyond management’s control) depending on if they increase or decrease
the company’s market capitalization. This study surveys compensation asymmetry within the
exploration and production industry due to its susceptibility to the lucky factor of commodity
price. The study finds that compensation asymmetry in the E&P industry is more extreme than
the broader market. In the broader market, previous studies have found that a CEO’s
compensation becomes less sensitive to luck in years of bad luck relative to years of good luck.
The directional relationship remains the same. In the E&P industry, however, the directional
relationship of this sensitivity reverses in bad luck years, and an E&P CEO’s total compensation
actually increases when market capitalization decreases due to luck. The driving factor of this
enhanced asymmetry are likely abundant external job market opportunities.
Keywords: Compensation, energy, pay for luck, asymmetry, CEO
Discipline: Business, Finance
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1. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation is a frequently covered topic by the media. Stories of CEOs
taking home millions of dollars, often times when their company is performing poorly, never fail
to garner attention and create outcry amongst investors and the broader population. In recent
years, the disproportionate face of many of these stories has been CEOs within the exploration
and production industry. The driving factor behind this phenomenon is likely the drastic success
of fracking that led to a domestic boom in oil and gas production. With this radical success,
however, came outsized compensation. Naturally, the industry leaders who spearheaded this
effort should be, and have been compensated well for their success. However, the exorbitance of
some of these compensation packages has come under criticism by the media as being pointedly
unjust.
Perhaps a more interesting point is that there seemed to be a number of notable cases of
exorbitant compensation even following the natural gas price collapse in 2008 and the oil price
collapse of 2014, when many E&P companies were performing poorly. In 2008, Aubrey
McClendon, CEO of natural gas producer Chesapeake Energy, took home a paycheck of over
$100 million dollars despite extremely poor stock price performance (Healy et al. 2012). This
was an unprecedented level of compensation regardless of industry, and to make matters worse,
it was at a time when shareholders were losing money and Chesapeake’s employees were being
laid off. Similarly, Tom Ward of SandRidge Energy received growing $20m+ paychecks every
year despite his company’s stock tumbling 80% since its initial public offering (Wilmoth 2017).
The overwhelming justification for these exorbitant salaries the board gives is that poor stock
performance is due to volatile commodity prices, which are beyond a managers control.
However, there seems to be little mention of this factor when commodity prices are booming and
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the majority of the industry’s executives are reaping the rewards. This seems to suggest the
phenomenon of asymmetry in how compensation varies with commodity price. It appears as if
an E&P CEO’s compensation benefits from commodity price increases, but is relatively
insulated from decreases.
While the severity of the cases of Aubrey McClendon and Tom Ward’s compensation
certainly aren’t representative of all E&P companies, a couple of quick calculations seem to
suggest that the same asymmetry problem may exist throughout the industry. From a period of
2007-2014 when oil prices were booming, the XOP, an ETF that tracks E&P firms increased
~90% while median sector CEO compensation increased ~63%. However, after oil prices
collapsed the XOP fell ~56% from 2014-2016, while median CEO salaries only fell ~12%. This
is a rough method of illustrating the phenomenon, but it suggests that the same compensation
dilemma may exist across the entire E&P industry. Because commodity price is such an integral
part of an E&P company’s value it seems as if it has become an easily manipulatable method of
asymmetrically compensating CEOs even when the factor is beyond their control. This research
paper will outline a detailed study of whether this asymmetry phenomenon actually exists within
the industry and if it does, what factors are driving it.

2. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION THEORY
2.1 The Function of the Compensation Contract
Before exploring how commodity price may asymmetrically benefit E&P CEOs, it is
important to cycle back and understand the broader theories of executive compensation design.
The need for a properly designed executive compensation policy stems from principal-agent
conflicts. A manager is naturally incentivized to maximize his personal wealth with the lowest
effort expenditure, while the shareholder’s goal is to maximize the value of the company to
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generate returns on their equity. Because the manager runs the day to day operations of the firm
and the shareholder cannot easily observe his or her actions, the best way to ensure the
shareholder’s goals are met is to align the manager’s decision-making incentives with those of
shareholders. The compensation contract is the tool that creates the bridge between these
incentives.
While this may seem like a simple concept in theory, this goal of perfect incentive
alignment through contract design is almost impossible to achieve in the real world due to
significant intervening factors. The two predominant factors are the influence of the talent
market for executives and poor corporate governance that prevents compensation committees
from operating at arms-length from managers. In addition, even if an ideal compensation scheme
has been reached it is not possible to know when or what it is composed of. This is because of
the endogeneity present in attempting to measure how compensation specifically affects firm
performance and the opaqueness from the public shareholder’s perspective as to what factors go
into determining compensation because a large portion is undisclosed or discretionary in nature.
Two theories have emerged from previous literature that attempt to explain how compensation
design might function in the real world.
2.2 Shareholder Value Maximization Theory
The first and most predominant theory in the literature is “shareholder value
maximization,” which argues that compensation contracts are simply the outcome of an efficient
talent market. They are designed to maximize value for shareholders under the constraint that
firms must compete in the labor market for executives. This talent market competition aspect
implies that firms must offer executives pay and incentives beyond that which is aligned with
shareholders (i.e equity or options). This includes a fixed base salary, severance packages, and
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other personal perks. The theory assumes that the board constructs the CEO’s compensation
contract to the point at which the CEO has no better external opportunity and the firm cannot
find a better executive with a greater value proposition for shareholders (Edmans et al. 2017).
2.3 Rent Extraction Theory
Shareholder value maximization makes major assumptions that may not be reflective of
reality, namely that compensation committee members design the policies at “arm’s length,”
meaning they are not influenced by relationships with managers themselves (Bebchuk et al.
2005). Common intuition tells us that this is unlikely to be true, which leads us to the second
major theory, the “rent extraction view.” The rent extraction view argues that managers have
significant influence over a company’s compensation committee through personal relationships
and are able to effectively set their compensation contracts themselves. The level of
compensation is subsequently determined as the maximum amount of pay they can extract
without drawing intervention from shareholders (Edmans et al. 2017).

3. PAY FOR LUCK LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Defining Pay for Performance vs Pay For Luck
According to the value maximization theory, compensation is only optimal if it rewards
CEOs for making decisions that increase value for shareholders, or if it is necessary to retain the
services of the CEO and prevent departure to another firm. The first of these two factors can be
deemed “pay for performance.” The CEO is compensated for exerting effort in making a
decision or creating a strategy that directly benefits shareholders. Thus, the optimal contract
should vary compensation on any observable measure that is informative of a CEO’s effort in
increasing firm value (Holstrom 1979). “Pay for Luck” then is compensation that is the result of
a change in firm value from factors that are beyond a CEO’s effort. It is important to note that
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these factors must be readily observable and measurable, such as commodity price or exchange
rates, not random variation from unknown effects. In optimal contract theory, these observable
luck measures should be included in a contract for the purpose of obtaining a more accurate
measure of what portion of firm success is due to a CEO’s effort. Observable measures of luck
should be essentially used to back out the firm’s success due to a manager’s performance. This
implies that compensation should not have any correlation with the luck measure. The
phenomenon of Pay for Luck in the real world, however, is that manager’s compensation does in
fact significantly vary with observable luck measures.
3.2 Evidence of Pay for Luck
The literature has exhibited evidence that Pay for Luck exists in a variety of different
settings. In a seminal study, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that CEO compensation had a
significant relationship with observable luck measures in three different contexts, the oil and gas
industry, the trading goods sector, and through relative performance evaluation. It was found that
the compensation varies just as much with “the general dollar as the lucky dollar.” This means
that the authors found little to no evidence of the filtering effect discussed in the preceding
paragraph that an observable measure of luck would be used for in an optimal contract (Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2001). In addition, Gopalan, Milbourne, and Song demonstrated that CEO pay
has a significant relationship with a firm’s sector performance, while according to optimal
contract theory there should be no correlation (2010). Thus, it is clearly established that
managers are compensated on luck measures in the real world.
3.3 Evidence of Asymmetry in Pay for Luck
Symmetric Pay for Luck does not benefit a risk averse manager. In fact, a risk averse
manager would prefer to have compensation vary purely on performance, than to have it vary
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symmetrically with a luck measure. This is because their firm related wealth can vary up or
down in equal increments based on how the luck measure performs. The concept of risk aversion
states that a loss in wealth hurts more than an equivalent gain. Because of this, a manager would
prefer to have no exposure at all than exposure to the risk of luck with an expected net effect on
wealth of zero (symmetric). Thus, managers only benefit from pay for luck when it is
asymmetric in nature. This means that their wealth increases with an increase in a luck measure
more than it decreases with an equivalent decrease in luck.
Evidence of asymmetry in pay for luck is a more contested issue, however existing
literature skews in favor of the idea that it exists. The leading work on the subject is from Garvey
and Milbourn, who found that there is significant asymmetry in the effect of pay for luck on
annual total compensation. By analyzing how total compensation correlates to market risk in
various time frames, they found that managers generally lose 25-45% less pay from bad luck,
than they benefit through good luck (Garvey and Milbourne 2006). Daniel, Li, and Naveen,
however, offer two criticisms of this conclusion that they argue diminishes the significance of
Garvey and Milbourne’s findings. First, they argue that annual compensation is not the right
dependent variable to properly measure pay for luck as it only encompasses a small portion of an
executive’s total compensation. Instead, they argue that the change in the executive’s firm
related wealth should be used to proxy “total effective compensation.” Multiple different
executive compensation scholars have supported this concept as discussed earlier (Edmans et al.
2017). In measuring the change in firm specific wealth the authors found no significant
asymmetry (Daniel et al. 2013). A second study criticized Garvey and Milbourne’s lack of
control for firm size. They found no significant asymmetry in pay for luck after excluding the top
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0.4% of firms by market cap (Daniel et al. 2016). Thus, it is not abundantly clear that pay for
luck asymmetry is a pervasive factor across all firms.
3.4 Theories of Why Pay for Luck Exists
Rent Skimming Rationale for Pay for Luck
Bertrand and Mullainathan justified the existence of pay for luck through the rent
skimming theory. They argued that managers have control over their board, and as a result can
influence their contracts to include compensation based on a luck measure. As a result, in times
of good performance when shareholders are less likely to scrutinize management compensation,
managers can extract more rents by taking pay for luck compensation that would likely go
unnoticed. They empirically support this claim by showing that executives of firms with low
corporate governance had significantly more pay for luck than firms with stringent governance.
Garvey and Milbourne concur with Bertrand and Mullainathan claiming that the asymmetry in
pay for luck they exhibited was more prominent in firms with lower corporate governance
measures.
Shareholder Value Maximization Rationale 1: CEO Retention
Another potential explanation utilizing the shareholder value maximization theory, is that
pay for luck is a necessary factor in determining the efficient compensation level in the CEO
talent market. Cremers and Grinstein tested how pay for luck varies based on the market for
talent within different industries. They found that homogenous industries have significantly
greater pay for luck than heterogeneous industries. Homogenous industries are ones in which
businesses have little differentiation such as in oil and gas, while heterogeneous are more
specialized. Their proposed rationale was that executives in homogenous industries have more
external opportunities because their skillset applies to a greater number of companies. Thus, the
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optimal compensation level necessary in order to retain an executive increases and decreases
with market performance because the number of external opportunities an executive can pursue
varies with market performance as well (Cremers and Grinstein 2013). This implies pay for luck
is necessary in order to maximize shareholder value as compensation increases when external
opportunities are high, and decreases when they are scarce. Another study that analyzed how
peer benchmarking affected executive pay contends that the asymmetry in pay for luck is not
explained by rent skimming, but rather the effect of benchmarking. The authors found no
significant asymmetry for firms that paid executives above peers, and attributed all of the
asymmetry Garvey and Milbourne found to firms in which executives were paid below peers.
The authors argue that this asymmetry in pay for luck reflects the use of competitive
benchmarking to proxy the reservation wage of a CEO (Bizjak et al. 2008). Firms that already
pay their executives below peers cannot afford to pay less in a market downturn due to the
enhanced risk of the executive leaving for an external opportunity, which creates this asymmetry.
Shareholder Value Maximization Rationale 2: Strategy Adjustment for Industry Trends
A second shareholder maximization rationale is that pay for luck is a necessary
component of compensation as it incentivizes the manager to put effort into anticipating and
appropriately responding to changes in market conditions. Gopalan, Milbourne, and Song found
that there was significantly more pay for luck in firms with multiple segments and firms that had
more flexibility to alter segment exposure. In these firms, pay for luck serves as an incentive for
the executives to invest in costly industry information and to consequently shift firm exposure to
sectors with more promising outlooks in order to benefit the firm in the case of industry shocks.
Thus, in some industries, pay for luck is actually an optimal contract feature in order to
maximize shareholder value (Gopalan et al. 2010). Bertrand and Mullainathan respond to this
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rationale with their own criticism. They agree that executives with exceptional industry
forecasting ability should be rewarded for such foresight, however, they tested pay for luck
amongst the average firm and still found a significant relationship. Utilizing this rationale would
imply that executives with just average industry forecasting ability are being compensated,
which they argue is likely not rational.

4. E&P INDUSTRY SIGNIFICANCE IN ANALYZING PAY FOR LUCK
4.1 Enhanced Exposure to Luck
The exploration and production industry produces almost a pure commodity product with
very little differentiation between firms. Because of this the value of E&P firms fluctuate
significantly with oil and gas prices. This provides us with a clearly observable, and extremely
significant measure of luck relative to other industries. Because of this enhanced industry effect,
evidence of pay for luck can be more easily distinguished in the E&P industry than in studies
that cover the entire market, which is what almost the entirety of previous literature entails.
Given the current debate about whether or not asymmetry in pay for luck actually exists, a
focused study of an industry in which pay for luck has an extremely significant effect could offer
some clarity. Additionally, it could be the case that performing these studies on the overall
market obscures some significance. It seems unlikely that industries respond in the same manner
to pay for luck, yet this seems to be an overarching assumption of much of the previous
literature.
4.2 Lack of Previous Academic Research
Commodity price is one of the single most important factors in the E&P industry. Yet,
academic executive compensation research covering this topic is limited to a two-page case
study within Bertrand and Mullainathan’s paper on pay for luck. The study analyzed the top 50
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oil and gas firms from 1977-1994, and was quick and dirty in nature. By looking at the 50 largest
oil and gas companies they are almost certainly looking at diversified oil and gas conglomerates
in which the relationship to commodity price is far more indirect than E&P firms. Thus, the
significance of their findings is likely obscured. Finally, the data is significantly outdated and
more than twenty years old. Since then, there has been significant economic developments in the
industry that have caused dramatic swings in commodity price as well as developments in the
structure of compensation policies. This provides an interesting new environment to test pay for
luck.
4.3 Major Economic Events in Recent Time Frame
These economic developments are largely due to the industry revolution of hydraulic
fracturing. Technological advancement in the process of hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking” led
to a domestic boom in the production of oil and gas as producers were able to pump from
previously inaccessible reserves (Zuckerman 2013). This was a major economic change that
quite literally shifted the United States’ dependence on imports for energy. The onset of fracking
and the subsequent market effects that followed for both oil and gas caused significant price
movements. First, for natural gas, oversupply by domestic producers without the proper
infrastructure to deliver it to high demand locations caused natural gas prices to collapse in 2008.
Second, for oil, in response to the rapid uptick in supply of oil from the United States, OPEC
drastically increased their own production, which caused oil prices to plummet. This sent the
domestic E&P industry into distress as producers struggled to breakeven on production costs.
These significant fluctuations in price paired with the significant changes in compensation that
followed makes this recent time period an ideal environment to test pay for luck.
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4.4 Overview of Current E&P Compensation Trends
Alvarez & Marsal conducted a survey of the compensation policies of the top 100 largest
exploration and production firms for the year ending 2016. The survey provides helpful insight
into how compensation for E&P firms may differ in structure compared to the broader market.
Firms were separated into different categories by size. There were a couple notable trends that
are helpful to identify in the context of pay for luck.
Roughly 80% of CEO compensation was incentive based pay (bonus + LTIC). This
suggests high potential exposure to pay for luck as a large portion of salary comes from
performance factors which can be influenced by observable luck measures (i.e Total Stock
Return). Additionally, discretion in compensation of annual bonuses was extremely prevalent in
the smallest half of E&P companies. For the bottom quartile, 68% of companies determined
annual bonuses through a purely discretionary basis. Discretion in compensation setting seems to
hint at less stringent corporate governance. Of the larger firms that use formulaic performance
metrics for annual bonuses, 79% incorporated production growth, 55% incorporated reserve
growth, and 55% included a measure of safety. Notably, since the 2014 oil price crash the
proportion of firms using production and reserve growth as a performance metric has shrunk
nearly 10% and has largely been replaced by the use of cost based metrics (G&A expense, LOE
expense). This suggests a change in strategy in response to new market conditions; however
veiled underneath this change could be a decrease in pay for luck during bad market times.
Long term incentives are structured primarily with a mix of time vesting RSUs and
performance vesting awards. The primary metric for the performance vesting awards is relative
total stock return with 92% of firms using it in 2017. Interestingly this is a ~15% increase in the
number of firms using it since 2014, when oil prices collapsed. This is the most significant
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evidence that seems to suggest asymmetric pay for luck as firms are shifting towards a relative
bench mark to cancel out the effects of market exposure when commodity prices have bottomed
out. The fact that these 15% of firms did not use relative TSR when oil prices were booming may
suggest that the executives at these firms were able to skim off some benefit from luck under the
guise of performance during this time period. This factor will certainly be explored more.

5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
This study will quantitatively determine if CEOs in the E&P industry are asymmetrically
compensated for Luck. If a relationship is found, then further analysis will be undertaken to
determine the driving factor behind this asymmetry.
Research Questions:
•

Are exploration and production CEOs asymmetrically compensated based on firm
performance that is attributable to sector returns?

•

If there is asymmetry in compensation due to Luck, what factors are driving it?

Hypotheses:
•

Hypothesis 1: Market capitalization changes due to sector returns (referred to as Luck)
have a significant relationship with E&P CEO’s compensation.

•

Hypothesis 2: E&P CEO’s annual compensation will be found to be asymmetrically more
sensitive to Luck in years of good luck than bad luck.

•

Hypothesis 3: The asymmetry in compensation due to Luck can be explained by either
poor corporate governance or the availability of external job opportunities.
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6. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.1 Data Overview
The data for this study will come from two primary sources. ExecuComp and the firm’s
proxy statements will provide the necessary compensation data. CRSP will provide stock price
data to calculate total stock return.
ExecuComp
ExecuComp is a compensation dataset that collects data from firm’s proxy statements.
Proxy statements contain overviews of compensation plan structure, performance benchmarks,
and executive employment contracts. ExecuComp breaks down compensation into multiple
different factors including salary, bonus, options, stock awards, and details on performance
plans. It also provides qualitative information about the executive at hand including age, tenure,
position, and the company they work for.
The data collected is from companies in the S&P 1500 and spans back to 1992. The date
range provides a long enough timeline to examine how compensation varies in multiple cyclical
troughs and upturns in both natural gas and oil price. ExecuComp, however, only covers
companies in the S&P 1500. Because of this it only provides data for 82 of the largest E&P
companies.
CRSP
CRSP is the most accurate source of stock return information. It will be used to calculate
total stock return for each firm. The data is thoroughly vetted and should be available for any
E&P company necessary to analyze.
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6.2 Regression Model Framework
The statistical methodology that will be employed to test pay for luck’s effect on
compensation will follow that introduced by Bertrand and Mullainathan and consequently
followed by much of the subsequent literature. This methodology will be catered specifically to
the E&P industry. The model follows a two-stage procedure.
First Stage: Predicting Firm Performance with Luck
Independent Variables: Measure of observable luck – SIC 1311 sector returns
Dependent Variables: Measure of performance – Total Stock Return
This stage of the model attempts to measure the sensitivity of firm performance with an
observable measure of luck. In this case, the performance measure chosen is total stock return as
it is commonly used in the industry for long term incentive plans. The independent variable is
industry returns according to the E&P SIC code 1311. While commodity price may have been a
more ideal measure of luck, the preceding literature uses industry returns as their observable luck
measure. A necessary step in this analysis will be to benchmark the results to previous papers to
compare how the E&P industry is different than the broader market, so it is necessary to use
sector returns. Additionally, sector returns incorporate most of the changes in commodity prices.
The output of this stage of the model is the predicted amount of firm performance that is created
by sector returns. The residual amount of stock return is the predicted amount of firm
performance that is created by manager skill.
Transformation before Second Stage:
The predicted amount of annual return that can be attributable to sector returns is
multiplied by market capitalization to get the change in market capitalization due to sector
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returns. Note that this term is simply called Luck from this point forth. This will be inputted into
the next stage of the regression as one of the independent variables.
Second Stage: Predicting Compensation with Performance created by Luck
Independent Variables: Luck
Dependent Variables: Measure of CEO compensation
This stage of the model predicts how executive compensation varies with Luck. The
primary independent variable is Luck as discussed earlier. The dependent variable is CEO
compensation. Total compensation, salary, annual cash bonus, stock awards, and option awards
will all be tested separately to see if the effect of pay for luck is stronger in any one category.
Overview of Controls
No controls are necessary in the first stage of the regression as sector returns (the
measure of luck) is all the study is concerned with. Additional controls would give a more
accurate measure of the amount of return attributable to skill (measured by the residual of the
model / everything that can’t be explained by the observable luck measure), which will not be
addressed in this study. The two primary controls in the second stage of the regression are CEO
tenure and market capitalization. These have been demonstrated to be the most predictive
variables of compensation. CEO tenure is in the second stage of the model explicitly as
compensation tends to increase the longer a CEO is at a company. Market capitalization is
controlled in the model implicitly. The predicted amount of annual return attributable to sector
returns is multiplied by the market capitalization of the respective company to find the change in
market capitalization attributable to general sector returns. This measure is defined as Luck. This
Luck variable is then inputted into the second stage of the regression, and does not explicitly
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need to be controlled for again. Market capitalization has been shown in multiple studies to be a
very significant predictor of compensation as CEOs of larger companies tend to be paid more.
Testing Asymmetry in Pay for Luck
In order to test if there is asymmetry in pay for luck three methodologies will be used:
Naveen et al’s relative industry performance regression, an adjusted version of this regression
using an additional “no luck” categorization, and another adjusted version using categorization
based on an absolute price distribution rather than returns.
Two Level Categorization of Bad and Good Luck
The majority of the preceding literature use SIC code industry returns as the proxy for
luck. The first regression methodology used in this paper will follow the process outlined in
Naveen et al. (Naveen et al. 2013). The following process is described in the context of the
second stage of the model, predicting change in compensation from Luck. To measure
asymmetry, a dummy variable for years of bad luck will be used. The dummy variable equals 1
for years in which industry returns are negative, and 0 when industry returns are positive. An
interaction variable between performance attributable to Luck and bad luck is used to measure
the partial effect on the sensitivity of compensation that a negative industry return year has
relative to a positive industry return year. There is significant asymmetry in pay for luck
compensation when the coefficient of this indicator variable is significantly negative. Two issues
with the categorization employed in this methodology will be potentially resolved with alternate
designs in the following sections.
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7. SUMMARY STATISTICS
7.1 Full Sample Summary Statistics
Table A depicts the summary statistics for all the independent and dependent variables.
Table A: Full Sample Summary Statistics
Obs

Min

1st Quartile

Median

3rd Quartile

Max

Mean

SD

Total Compensation ($000)

659

$0

$1,938

$4,215

$9,003

$112,464

$7,066

$9,376

Base Salary ($000)

659

0

432

649

971

1,750

724

388

Cash Bonus ($000)

659

0

0

161

848

76,951

876

3,836

Stock Awards ($000)

659

0

6

1,642

3,875

61,078

3,189

5,256

Option Grants ($000)

659

0

0

393

1,665

62,681

1,584

3,967

Annual Return

659

-95%

-21%

11%

42%

516%

18%

63%

Sector Return

659

-33%

-10%

19%

26%

33%

10%

20%

Luck ($000)

659

-$77,991

-$138

$290

$1,827

$63,028

$1,156

$6,990

Market Capitalization ($000)

659

12,080

878,967

2,538,686

10,631,645

141,240,883

9,382,883

16,532,187

CEO Tenure (Years)

659

0

2

6

11

38

8

7

Total Compensation ($000)

533

$273

$1,968

$3,917

$7,139

$24,263

$5,266

$4,270

Base Salary ($000)

533

0

432

625

912

1,750

691

362

Cash Bonus ($000)

533

0

0

159

725

2,900

466

667

Stock Awards ($000)

533

0

76

1,602

3,459

12,075

2,363

2,726

Option Grants ($000)

533

0

0

393

1,367

7,642

929

1,350

Annual Return

533

-74%

-20%

9%

40%

171%

13%

45%

Sector Return

533

-33%

-10%

19%

26%

33%

10%

19%

Luck ($000)

533

-$9,403

-$114

$318

$1,452

$16,256

$954

$3,147

Market Capitalization ($000)

533

38,938

921,453

2,382,200

8,436,971

96,752,340

6,646,700

10,335,553

CEO Tenure (Years)

533

0

2

6

11

38

8

7

Panel A: Original Sample

Panel B: Winsorized Subsample

The top and bottom 2.5% of observations for annual returns, total compensation, and Luck have
been winsorized due to significant outliers. As a result, the data started with 659 observations
and was cleaned down to 533.
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7.2 Good and Bad Luck Subsamples
Table B: Bad vs Good Luck Subsample Summary Statistics
Obs

Min

1st Quartile

Median

3rd Quartile

Max

Mean

SD

Total Compensation ($000)

379

$308

$1,966

$4,039

$7,127

$24,263

$5,346

$4,391

Base Salary ($000)

379

0

440

615

940

1,750

697

362

Cash Bonus ($000)

379

0

0

187

825

2,900

522

718

Stock Awards ($000)

379

0

265

1,641

3,286

12,075

2,332

2,641

Option Grants ($000)

379

0

0

410

1,345

7,641

954

1,407

Annual Return

379

-68%

2%

23%

51%

171%

28%

41%

Sector Return

379

2%

13%

25%

27%

33%

21%

10%

Luck ($000)

379

$1

$265

$782

$2,429

$16,256

$2,001

$2,857

Market Capitalization ($000)

379

38,398

100,086

2,722,890

9,395,723

96,752,340

7,376,757

11,186,796

CEO Tenure (Years)

379

0

3

6

11

37

8

7

Total Compensation ($000)

154

$273

$2,035

$3,670

$7,159

$20,680

$5,065

$3,959

Base Salary ($000)

154

21

409

641

875

1,750

674

327

Cash Bonus ($000)

154

0

0

54

456

2,500

326

493

Stock Awards ($000)

154

0

0

1,461

3,698

12,059

2,439

2,931

Option Grants ($000)

154

0

0

261

1,434

6,306

866

1,200

Annual Return

154

-74%

-47%

-28%

-7%

53%

-25%

28%

Sector Return

154

-33%

-19%

-16%

-12%

-2%

-16%

8%

Luck ($000)

154

-$9,404

-$2,206

-$573

-$182

-$16

-$1,621

$2,210

Market Capitalization ($000)

154

62,410

690,732

1,645,999

5,503,473

50,455,189

4,850,000

7,595,351

CEO Tenure (Years)

154

0

2

5.5

11

38

7.3

7.2

Panel A: Good Luck

Panel B: Bad Luck

Table B provides the summary statistics for the two level categorization bad luck (when
sector returns are negative) and good luck (sector returns are positive) subsamples. Notably, the
means of each compensation variable are not significantly different between the two subsamples.

8. RESULTS
8.1 Using Previous Studies’ Categorization Methodologies (Two-Level)
As discussed earlier, the key issue with detecting asymmetry in compensation due to
luck, is how bad or good luck is defined. The primary regression in this study is run defining
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good luck as when sector returns are positive, and bad luck as when sector returns are negative.
This is the methodology predominately used in the previous literature (Garvey & Milbourne and
Naveen et al.). Utilizing this comparable categorization helps benchmark the results of the
regression with previous results for sanity checking purposes.
Table C: Two Level Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp.
Salary
Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck

0.89***

Good Luck x Bad Luck

-2.07

CEO Tenure
2

***

0.08***
***

-0.06

***

9.22

-0.16

-7.51

4.71

0.05***
**

***

0.32***
***

-1.02

0.23***
***

-0.34

-14.12

7.1

R

0.36

0.34

0.07

0.17

0.18

Observations

533

533

533

533

533

Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck category suppressed for convenience

The first primary result of the regression is that each piece of compensation varies
significantly with Luck, or market cap sensitivity due to factors beyond an executive’s control.
This is noted by the significant coefficient on the good luck measure (the baseline category). The
second primary result is that there is significant asymmetry in compensation’s sensitivity to Luck
between good and bad luck years for all pieces of compensation. Interpreting the economic
relationship for total compensation is as follows: in good luck years (years with positive sector
returns), an E&P CEO’s total compensation increases 89 cents for every $1000 increase in
market capitalization due to sector returns. Conversely, in bad luck years (years with negative
sector returns) an E&P CEO’s total compensation actually increases by $1.19 (.89-2.073) for
every $1000 decrease in market capitalization due to sector returns. Comparing these results to
what previous papers have found is a useful way to determine how the E&P industry might be
different from the broader market context.
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Figure 1: Previous Paper’s Regression Results (Naveen et al. 2009)

The first model that was run in this study is similar to the one run by Gopalan,
Milbourne, and Song (2010) which analyzed asymmetry in the absolute level of total
compensation. The economic relationship they discovered was that “when Luck is up (increase
in market cap of $1000), the pay for the CEO of a median-risk firm increases by $1.04 (=2.02–
23

0.5×1.96), but when Luck is down (decrease in market cap of $1000), it decreases only by 76
cents (=1.04 - .28) (Naveen et al. 2009). The Luck coefficient in good luck years for the E&P
firms is similar to that in GMS (.89 vs 1.04 respectively). The major diversion is how sensitivity
changes in bad luck years for E&P firms. GMS found that across the market (data including all
industries), during a bad luck year, sensitivity to Luck decreased relative to good luck years,
however the directional relationship with Luck was still positive: when Luck decreased,
compensation decreased (in GMS, the coefficient is still positive in bad luck years). However, in
this study’s E&P data, total compensation’s sensitivity to Luck completely reverses direction in
bad luck years (the coefficient becomes negative). Rather than simply becoming less sensitive to
Luck, compensation actually increases when bad luck lowers market capitalization. Moreover,
this bad luck coefficient is quite large as well. An E&P CEO’s compensation actually increases
more for a $1000 decrease in market cap due to sector returns, than it does for a $1000 increase
in market cap due to sector returns ($1.19 vs $0.89).
8.2 Sensitivities based on Type of Compensation
It has been shown to this point that there is significant asymmetry in total compensation
due to the observable measure of luck, sector returns. What this implies is that compensation
committees are consciously crafting CEO’s compensation contracts to vary based on sector
returns, or something highly correlated with sector returns. Thus, it is important to determine
what part of total compensation (salary, cash bonus, stock awards, option awards) is being
manipulated the most to create this asymmetric relationship. Referencing Table B, the order of
sensitivity in good luck years for the parts of compensation rank from high to low as follows:
stock awards (.322), option awards (.227), salary (.071), and cash bonus (.0519). The order of
sensitivity in bad luck years from high to low is as follows: stock awards (-.70 = .322 – 1.018),
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option awards (-.11 = .227 - .336), salary (-.08 = .071 - .155), and cash bonus (-.01 = .0519 .0598). The key takeaways from these results is that stock and option awards are the most
sensitive to Luck in good luck years, while stock awards are by far the most inversely sensitive
part of compensation in bad luck years (-.70 vs next highest value option awards at -.11). Before
concluding that stock awards are what is being manipulated to drive inverse sensitivity, it is
necessary to consider other factors that may be affecting these coefficients. The magnitudes of
these sensitivity coefficients are affected by two key factors: The portion of total compensation
they make up, as well as the extent to which they are being manipulated by compensation
committees depending on whether or not a year is good luck or bad luck, which is the key factor
of interest for this study. In order to gauge compensation manipulation properly, the portion of
the total compensation make up must first be taken into account. The structure of total
compensation has changed significantly between 1992 and 2016. The primary change related to
this study is the shift from option based compensation to stock based compensation after the
early 2000s. This structural shift is evident in Figure 1.
Figure 2: Mean Compensation Structure vs Sector Returns

Mean Compensation Structure vs Sector Returns
100%

40%
30%

80%

20%
70%
10%

60%
50%

0%

40%

-10%

30%

-20%
20%
-30%

10%
0%

-40%

Salary

Cash Bonus

Stock Grants

Option Grants

Other

Sector Returns

25

Sector Returns

% of Total Compensation

90%

Because of this structural shift in compensation makeup from options to stock awards,
determining sensitivity based on the entire range of data from 1992 to 2016 does not paint a clear
picture when analyzing asymmetry for specific types of compensation (whereas it does for total
compensation). To take this into account the same regression was run over two subsets of data
split by time. The first subset is for firm years from 1992 to 2004. The second subset is from
2005 to 2016. The distinction was made because 2005 was the first year in which stock awards
became a larger portion of total compensation than option awards.
Table D: Fiscal Year Subset Regression Coefficients
1992-2004

2005-2016

Total Comp. Stock Awards Option Awards Total Comp. Stock Awards Option Awards
***

*

Good Luck

0.65

Good Luck x Bad Luck

-2.72***

-0.32

CEO Tenure

-54.85

**

R2
Observations

0.13

0.14

**

0.90

***

***

0.34

0.24

***

-0.66***

-1.91***

-0.87***

-0.41***

-23.65

-11.41

44.09

10.05

17.47

0.27

0.06

0.08

0.38

0.18

0.31

157

157

157

376

376

376

*

*

Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck category suppressed for convenience

The results of these subset regressions reveal that between 1992-2004 options awards
were the most sensitive part of compensation from Luck in both good and bad luck years. In
good luck years, both stock awards and option awards had similar sensitivities. In bad luck years,
option rewards revealed significantly more inverse asymmetry than stock awards, which lost
significance in the model. The trend reversed in the 2005-2016 regression subset. Stock awards
became more sensitive in good luck years than option awards (.34 vs .24), and more inversely
sensitive in bad luck years (-.87 vs -.41). It should be further noted that total compensation was
significantly inversely asymmetrical in both timeframe subsets. Thus, this concept of inverse
compensation asymmetry that seems unique to the E&P industry has been present throughout the
1992-2016 timeframe. It did not start happening at some point within. However, due to secular
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shifts in how compensation is structured, the particular piece of compensation that committees
manipulate to create this asymmetry did change through time. Between 1992 to somewhere
between 2004-2006, asymmetry was primarily created through option awards. Beyond 20042006, asymmetry was primarily created through stock awards.
8.3 Sanity Checking Results
Visually Analyzing Trends in Compensation
The results show that within the E&P industry compensation’s sensitivity to Luck
becomes a significantly inverse relationship in bad luck years. This is a novel finding that has not
been found in past studies (the relationship was still positive in bad luck years, just less
sensitive). Because of this, sanity checking through data visualization is helpful. In the following
graphs, the key aspects to look for are whether the median measure of compensation increases in
years when returns are negative. The mean observations are skewed by significant outliers.
Figure 3: Total Compensation vs Sector Returns

Total Compensation vs Sector Returns
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Figure 2 reveals that median total compensation in the E&P industry has been increasing
over time. In recession years (01-02, 08) total compensation remained stable despite significantly
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negative sector returns. What is even more notable however, is that after the oil crash of 2014
which resulted in significantly negative sector returns, median compensation increased between
2014 and 2015. This seems to support the finding of inverse asymmetry.
Figure 4: Stock Grants vs Sector Returns
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Figure 3 reveals a similar conclusion. The focus for stock grants should be post 2004. In
2008 the value of median stock grants remained the same despite significantly negative stock
returns. Similarly, median stock grants increased between 2014 and 2015 despite the sector
return decrease resulting from the oil price crash.
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Figure 5: Option Grants vs Sector Returns
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The focus on option grants should be pre-2004. The major negative sector return pre2004 happened during the technology bubble in 2001. The median value of option grants spiked
up between 2000 and 2001 despite the significantly negative corresponding sector return. This
again supports the conclusion of inverse asymmetry found in the regression.
Taking out Recession Years from the Regression
Of the 24 years in this dataset, only six are considered bad luck years (negative sector
returns). These years are 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2014, and 2015. Two out of these six years
were (2001 and 2008) major economic recessions and were not idiosyncratic to the E&P
industry. During these recession years there could have been unique compensation dynamics at
play. Thus, it is plausible that these recession years could be driving the inverse asymmetry that
was discovered. In order to disprove this the regression was run excluding firm years from both
2001 and 2008. Table E shows the results.
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Table E: Excluding Recessions Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp.
Salary
Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck

0.89***

Good Luck x Bad Luck

-2.29

CEO Tenure
2

***

-4.23

0.07***
***

-0.05

**

9.22

-0.16
4.67

0.05***

**

0.32***
***

-1.23

0.23***
***

-0.34

-7.22

5.55

R

0.38

0.34

0.07

0.22

0.19

Observations

484

484

484

484

484

Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck category suppressed for convenience

The table shows that the inverse asymmetry is still highly significant, not only in total
compensation, but almost all other compensation components. The interaction term for cash
bonus was the only one to lose significance. Thus, the impact of the recession can be ruled out as
a confounding factor for the inverse asymmetry.
8.4 Results using Other Luck Categorization Methodologies
The luck categorization methodology in the prior section was based on the categorization
utilized in previous papers for the purposes of benchmarking results. However, this many not be
the most economically accurate categorization. Thus, the regression was run under two other
categorization methods to see if the inverse asymmetry result holds.
Three Level Luck Categorization
Using a categorization method that uses a breakeven point of 0 sector returns (negative =
bad luck, positive = good luck) may not be accurate because years that are slightly positive or
slightly negative likely have similar compensation dynamics. Asymmetry is created when a
compensation board consciously decides to change the amount of compensation they give to an
executive based on the market conditions of the specific year. It is hypothesized that boards are
unlikely to make significant changes, if any changes at all, for years in which the effect of good
luck and bad luck is insignificant. For example, a year in which industry returns are 1% is likely
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pretty much equivalent in the board’s mind as a year in which returns are -1%. The bandwidth of
this lack of action may extend out a couple percentage in either direction.
Adding a third category of “no luck” would be helpful in representing this factor. Years
within a certain percentage bandwidth from 0% industry returns will be considered “no luck”
years, while years of extreme change in either direction will be considered bad luck or good luck.
It is hypothesized that the inclusion of these insignificant industry return years in bad luck and
good luck done in previous studies may be dampening the significance of the asymmetry that
may truly be present. Using this categorization will likely isolate the years in which boards
consciously make pay for luck decisions to the bad and good luck categories, while allocating
years in which action is likely not taken to the no luck category.
For the following three level categorization regression, bad luck was characterized as
years in which sector returns are below -15%, no luck when sector returns are between -15% and
15%, and good luck when sector returns are greater than 15%.
Table F: Three Level Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp.
Salary
Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck

0.85

Good Luck x No Luck

-0.85

Good Luck x Bad Luck

-1.76

CEO Tenure
2

R

Observations

***

0.07

***

-0.08

***

-0.13

-9.18
0.25
533

***

4.58

0.05

***

0.33

***

***

-0.04

-0.42

***

-0.07

*

-0.82

**

9.12

0.25
533

**

0.08
533

***
***

0.20

***

-0.06
***

-0.26

-14.56

6.71

0.11
533

0.14
533

Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck and no luck category suppressed for convenience

The three level regression output does not necessarily support the hypothesis that a three
level categorization reveals more asymmetry in compensation due to Luck. For total
compensation, in good luck years, an E&P CEO’s total compensation increases 85 cents for
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every $1000 increase in Luck. In no luck years an E&P CEO’s total compensation does not
change (0 = .85-.85) with Luck. In bad luck years, an E&P CEO’s total compensation increases
91 cents for every $1000 decrease in Luck. This compares to total compensation increasing 89
cents in good luck years, and increasing $1.19 in bad luck years with the two level categorization
mentioned earlier. Thus, the sensitivity in both good and bad luck years has actually somewhat
declined despite using more extreme classifications of both good and bad luck.
While this initial hypothesis of enhanced asymmetry was not supported, perhaps a more
interesting, unexpected conclusion resulted in the no luck category. That is that in no luck years,
compensation has very little sensitivity to Luck. For total compensation the coefficient is 0 (.85 .85), for salary it is -.01 (.07 - .08), for cash bonus .01 (.05 -. 04), for stock awards
-.09 (.33 - .42), and for option awards .14 (.20 - .06). This lack of sensitivity seems to imply that
compensation committees do not sensitize a CEO’s compensation much with sector returns when
sector returns are not extreme in nature. When they are, it seems these committees employ this
strategy to greater effect as the inverse asymmetry between good and bad luck years is still
present.
Using Absolute Prices instead of Returns to Categorize Luck
The second issue in previous literature’s methodologies regards using sector returns
instead of absolute price levels to categorize years of good and bad luck. Doing this does not
reflect the reality of how compensation boards make decisions about pay for luck. For example,
consider how this model takes into account commodity price shocks. The year in which a
negative price shock happens will be considered a year of significant negative industry returns
and will rightly be allocated into the bad luck subsample. However, the years following, in which
there might be moderate price recovery after the initial shock would be years of positive industry

32

returns because the returns are calculated off a much lower benchmark. These subsequent years
will be categorized by the model as years of good luck, simply because the industry returns are
positive after a significantly negative year. In reality, the compensation committees are likely not
thinking that these subsequent years are “good luck.” In fact, it is just the opposite. Despite
positive industry returns in these years they are likely making pay for luck decisions more in
accordance with bad luck years as they will still be recovering from the price shock. Yet, the
relative performance model will still consider them good luck years. It is hypothesized that the
results of previous models in the literature may be inaccurate for cyclical industries because of
this consideration.
To alleviate this issue, a new methodology of good and bad luck categorization is
proposed. Rather than using the return on the SIC 1311 sector, absolute levels of commodity
prices are used: a mix of oil and natural gas prices. First, a distribution of WTI oil prices and
Henry Hub natural gas prices over the data set time frame will be created (1992 -2016). These
are real prices that are adjusted for inflation so earlier years do not have a bias to be lower. The
real oil and gas prices are standardized into Z scores, so oil which has a higher price does not
carry arbitrarily more weight in the metric than natural gas. These Z scores are then averaged
together to get the standardized price metric. Years above the third quartile according to this
metric will be categorized as good luck years. Years below the first quartile will be categorized
as bad luck and the middle 50% of the data as no luck. Using this absolute price metric to
categorize years will presumably cancel out the rebound effect that mistakenly categorizes some
of the years in the dataset using the returns based system. Using the same commodity price shock
example again, when the initial shock happens it is correctly categorized as a bad luck year
because the absolute price drops significantly, likely to below the first quartile in the distribution.
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The difference from the previous methodology is that in the following years, even though there
will likely be a price rebound (implying positive sector returns), the years will still be
categorized as bad luck because despite the positive return from the lower benchmark year, the
absolute value of the average commodity price is still very low. This will result in the follow-on
years after the shock being classified as bad luck as well. Thus, this methodology properly
captures a realistic concept of luck for cyclical industries.
Table G: Year Categorization by Absolute Price Methodology
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2 = Good Luck, 1 = No Luck, 0 = Bad Luck

The table above depicts the categorization of each year according to this methodology. It
should be noted that the entirety of the bad luck years are pre-2000, while all of the good luck
years are post-2005, even though the prices were adjusted for inflation.
Table H: Absolute Price Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp.
Salary
Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck

0.65

Good Luck x No Luck

-0.48

***

0.05

***

-0.04

Good Luck x Bad Luck

-0.54

CEO Tenure

21.31

2

R

Observations

0.13
533

***
***

.01
***

6.30

0.13
533

***

0.06

-0.03
-0.03
11.75

**

0.08
533

***

0.19

***

-0.11

0.20

-0.21

***
***

-0.20

-0.10

5.611

7.05

0.05
533

0.11
533

Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck and no luck category suppressed for convenience

The primary takeaway from the regression results for the absolute price categorization is
that the bad luck interaction variable became insignificant. This is likely due to poor economic
categorization that resulted from this methodology. As mentioned before, all the bad luck years
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are clustered in the 1990s. Thus, the external validity of using this metric for bad luck may not be
quite strong. The no luck interaction variable, however, was significant. It showed a similar lack
of sensitivity that aligns with what was found in the previous three stage categorization
regression result. This gives further confidence to the conclusion that in year with little luck
based market returns, CEO’s compensation benefits very little from luck.

9. EXPLAINING DISCOVERED ASYMMETRY IN PAY FOR LUCK
9.1 Corporate Governance Subsamples
Now that it has been established that this inverse compensation asymmetry due to luck
exists in the E&P industry, it is important to understand what is driving it. The two predominant
explanations in the previous literature were poor corporate governance and the presence of
external job opportunities for CEOs. In the poor corporate governance scenario, CEOs of firms
have effective control over their own compensation contracts through strong relationships with
the board. This allows them to manipulate their compensation in years of bad luck to still benefit.
To test whether E&P firms with poor corporate governance are driving these results, the
regression was run on firms that had bad corporate governance as well as firms that had good
corporate governance.
The categorization of bad and good governance was created using the Gompers et al.,
corporate governance score. This governance score counts the number of provisions that restrict
shareholder rights. It ranges from 1-24 with lower being more favorable for shareholders (good
governance), and higher being unfavorable (bad governance). The author’s primary finding was
that a portfolio of firms with extremely good governance (democracy portfolio: governance score
< 5) had significantly higher stock market returns than firms with very bad governance
(dictatorship portfolio: governance score > 14) (Gompers et al. 2003). The goal in categorizing

35

these E&P firms was to mimic the democracy and dictatorship portfolio categorization as closely
as possible. However, an issue arose in the fact that the governance score range in the dataset of
E&P firms was not as extreme as Gomper et al.’s data as can be seen in Figure 5 below. An
additional issue was the fact that the governance score data was only available up until 2006.
Figure 6: Governance Score Distribution

Unit of Analysis: Firm Years

Because of the lack of extremity in the data variation, a more moderate categorization was used.
Good governance firm years were classified as those with governance scores of less than 8. Bad
governance firm years were classified as those with governance scores of greater than 10.
Table I: Governance Subsamples Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Bad Gov
Good Luck
Good Luck x No Luck
Good Luck x Bad Luck
CEO Tenure
2

R
Observations

***

0.67

0.40
-0.91

***

Good Gov
***

0.59

*

0.57
-1.18

***

-71.67

-42.45

0.31
116

0.28
125

Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck and no luck category suppressed for convenience
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The primary takeaway from this governance subsample regression is that the inverse
asymmetry relationship we have been noticing in all of these regressions is still present in the
good governance subsample. If poor corporate governance was really driving this asymmetry,
the interaction variable of Good Luck x Bad Luck would theoretically lose significance for firms
with good governance. In fact there is very little difference in the sensitivities of total
compensation to Luck between the bad governance and good governance subsamples. This
seems to imply that governance does not play a very significant role in pay for luck for E&P
firms. There must be some other confounding factor that is driving the asymmetry, the most
likely of which are the presence of external job market opportunities for E&P CEOs.
9.2 Potential Job Market Explanation
As mentioned in the literature review, the presence of external job market opportunities
for CEOs is a significant determinant of compensation asymmetry due to luck. Moreover, they
found that a CEO’s compensation in industries that are internally homogeneous, or have very
little differentiation from firm to firm, have higher asymmetry in pay for luck. This is because
the CEO’s skillset is more transferable to other companies, which leads to a greater number of
external job opportunities, which leads to better compensation dynamics in order to retain them
at the firm (Cremers and Grinstein 2013). The exploration and production industry is the very
definition of a homogenous industry. Firms produce commodity products that are the same at
every company. Consequentially, the process of managing operations at an E&P firm is
relatively the same from firm to firm. This means that E&P CEOs have plenty of potential jobs if
they were to seek employment elsewhere.
Another very significant factor that effects E&P CEO’s external job opportunities is the
tremendous inflow of private capital into the E&P industry that started after the major
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technological shock of the fracking revolution. The implementation of fracking mean that vast
quantities of reserves that were deemed inaccessible before could now potentially be drilled.
Private investors, particularly private equity funds, realized this and started raising capital to
deploy into start-up exploration and production companies. The significant inflow of capital can
be seen in the following figure.
Figure 7: Capital Raised for Energy Private Equity Funds per Year

Private equity energy funds were practically non-existent in 2003 with only ~1
billionraised. After fracking started to be adopted the capital raised increased exponentially. The
total amount sought for 2015, just 12 years later was ~75 billion. When this capital is deployed
in new start-up E&P companies, management teams are needed to run operations. Private equity
funds poach management from other larger E&P firms. The incentive schemes these private
equity funds offer to CEOs to get them to lead one of these private companies are incredibly
attractive. If the company is successful, the options and stock grants a CEO will receive make the
upside exponential, most often far greater than the potential upside they have at an established
company.
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In order to keep their management teams from being poached by private equity funds,
publicly traded, established E&P companies must significantly improve their compensation
dynamics. One of these dynamics that they implement into the CEO’s contract is likely what we
are observing through this study: inverse asymmetry. It effectively guarantees that the CEO’s
compensation will continue to increase no matter if the E&P sector loses money or gains money.
In a volatile industry, this is a very attractive job characteristic.
Thus, the fact that an E&P CEO’s skillset is easily transferrable to other companies
paired with the enormous increase in demand for E&P CEOs from private capital seem to
contribute to significantly more external job opportunities for E&P CEOs relative to CEOs in
other industries. This significant number of external job opportunities is the most likely
explanation for why the asymmetry in compensation due to luck is much more drastic in the
E&P industry than other industries.

10. DISCUSSION
These findings are significant to both academic researchers focused on compensation as
well as actual compensation committees in the E&P industry. For academic researchers, the
study is a focused deep dive into an industry that is affected the most by factors of luck
(commodity price). All previous studies have focused on the broader market and how
compensation varies with luck in the aggregate across all industries. Focusing on the E&P
industry highlights just how significant this asymmetry can become. Because job market
opportunities are so high for E&P CEOs, the asymmetry relationship is such that their
compensation actually increases when the market cap of their company decreases from lucky
factors. This type of inverse relationship in bad luck years has not been observed in previous
studies. Further avenues of research could dive into the job market explanation for this
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relationship more fully. Due to a lack of access on CEO job market data, this relationship could
not be quantitatively supported. A researcher with access to this data could help delineate the
magnitude of the impact the job market has on compensation asymmetry as well as other
interesting questions such as how lucrative private equity pay packages are compared to those
offered by larger, public companies.
The findings in this study are also useful for E&P compensation committees as it
provides an aggregate industry-wide benchmark of how a CEO’s compensation varies with luck.
When crafting the compensation arrangement for their respective CEO, these committees must
be cognizant of including this asymmetry compensation dynamic (compensation is always rising
no matter the market state) as other companies can outcompete for talent by offering it. If they do
not, the CEO will likely leave for other opportunities. They must balance this, however, with not
overpaying their CEO at the expense of shareholders. The quantitative finding of how sensitive
the average E&P CEO’s compensation is to sector returns in good and bad luck years provides a
very useful benchmark to go off of when designing these contracts.

11. CONCLUSION
The question was posed at the beginning of this paper of whether or not compensation
sensitivity due to luck was necessary, as these luck factors are out of a CEO’s control. Moreover,
an even more challenging question was whether asymmetry in compensation due to luck was
necessary. The findings of this study seem to definitively point out that both sensitivity, and
asymmetry in sensitivity are both necessary in order to retain CEOs. It is easy to adopt a cynical
mindset that the asymmetry is simply a result of compensation committees rewarding closely
tied CEOs at the expense of shareholders. This could very likely be the case if looking at one
individual poorly governed company. However, this stark asymmetry in compensation due to

40

luck is an aggregate trend across the entire industry. While there may certainly be outlier
compensation committees that are corrupt in nature, the average committee which this study
effectively analyzes is presumably made up of rational individuals who are acting in the best
interest of shareholders. Thus, this trend almost assuredly benefits shareholders in an indirect
manner. It allows for retention of key, talented CEOs who are necessary for a company to do
well.
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